DFIR learning notes / 03 of 06 · Access investigation

Finding suspicious access

Reduce a large set of events to useful leads, then compare them with the user’s normal activity.

Start with a focused scope

Begin with the affected account and an initial time window around the reported activity. Record what prompted the investigation, such as a suspicious inbox rule or a fraudulent email.

Use the available audit and sign-in records. Widen the time window or include other accounts when the evidence points beyond the initial scope.

Extract unique IP addresses

An IP address can help connect records to a network source. Extract the IP addresses associated with the account and create a list in which each address appears once. Keep the original event records.

Deduplication
Removing repeated values so each IP address appears once.
Why it helps
A thousand events might contain only ten unique IP addresses. Reviewing that smaller list helps choose where to investigate next.

This reduces the number of leads, not the amount of evidence. Keep the original events so you can return to the activity behind each address.

From many records to useful leads
  1. 01Scoped eventsAffected account and initial time window
  2. 02Unique IPsRemove repeated addresses
  3. 03Contextual reviewBaseline · provider · related activity
Deduplicate the list of IPs while preserving the original event records.

Understand normal user activity

A baseline is the activity we would normally expect for the user.

Location
Where does the user normally work, and have they travelled recently?
Network
Which office, home, mobile or VPN networks do they use?
Applications and devices
Which clients and devices do they usually use?
Timing
Does the activity fit the user’s usual working hours?

Triage the IP list

Use IP intelligence to add context to the logs. IP-API (opens in a new tab) provides approximate location and network-provider information. AbuseIPDB (opens in a new tab) shows reports of abuse associated with an IP address.

Geolocation
An approximate location associated with the IP, rather than proof of the person’s physical location.
Provider
Whether the address belongs to a residential ISP, hosting provider, mobile network or other service.
Reputation
Reports of previous abuse that may support a lead, but do not establish what happened in this incident.

A VPN, hosting provider or unfamiliar country can deserve investigation, but it is not automatically malicious. Compare several sources with the actual sign-in and audit activity.

Follow a known suspicious event

If an unauthorised inbox rule is already identified, inspect its account, time, IP address and any session identifier. That event can provide a stronger starting point than an unfamiliar location alone.

For example, a user normally based in Melbourne might have activity associated with an overseas hosting provider. Check travel, VPN use, authentication results and mailbox events around the same time before attributing it to an attacker.

Keep a working list of leads

Expected
Activity that fits the user’s normal behaviour and available evidence.
Suspicious
Activity needing further checks or supporting evidence.
Activity linked to the compromise
Activity linked to the compromise by the investigation evidence.

Record the reason for each assessment. Keep uncertain leads visible and revisit them when new evidence appears.

Key takeaway

Use unique IPs to organise the investigation, then assess each lead in context. An unfamiliar address is a starting point; related events help establish whether the activity was unauthorised.

Further reading

Based on my learning notes from the DFIR BEC investigation track.